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Introduction 
Although few Spanish economic historians make it explicit, most of them 
seem to take for granted the importance of protectionism for Spain's eco-
nomic growth in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first 
third of the twentieth century. Broadly speaking, it can be argued that 
most of the literature favours a positive assessment of the incidence of pro-
tectionism on economic growth, although this is expressed with several 
nuances. On the one hand, and coinciding with Flores de Lemus, most 
are critical of excessive protectionist measures that the rhetoric proposi-
tion of 'integral protection' would imply. But, on the other hand, they 
suggest that a more free-trade alternative was too risky. In their opinion, 
the lack of development of the Spanish economy implied serious dif-
ficulties for initiating specialisation processes, and, consequently, both 
factors and resources could disappear if they were forced to face inter-
national competition (instead of moving to other productive sectors with 
comparative advantage). 2 
That is, most authors hide behind the inevitability of the protectionist 
option, either for political reasons,3 or instead for economic ones.4 In 
other words: the belief that an alternative and milder form of protection-
ism would have been politically unfeasible and negative as a whole in eco-
nomic terms.5 Only during these last few years have some authors 
emphasised the possibility that, in the absence of such a high level of pro-
tection, the Spanish economy may have reacted similarly to other coun-
tries in that period, thus precipitating some of the transformations that 
were eventually undertaken in the second half of the twentieth century.6 
Protectionism achieved a central role in the political debate of the 
second half of the nineteenth century and, in consequence, in the recent 
historiographic debate. The study of the protectionist law-making process, 
the instruments used and the objectives followed has concentrated a great 
deal of research efforts in recent years. 7 Despite the fact that these studies 
have provided an in-depth analysis and have enriched the vision of this 
period, they have left aside some of the essential questions on the role 
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played by commercial policy in Spanish economic growth in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. 
Thus, it seems necessary to refocus on a few simple but essential questions: 
1 Did Spain have a high or a low protection in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and first third of the twentieth? That is, was the 
evolution of protection in Spain fundamentally different to other 
countries with similar welfare levels? 
2 What were the main causes that explain the Spanish protection on 
some sectors at the expense of others? 
3 Did these differing levels of protection have important consequences 
for Spanish economic growth, and, if so, were they positive or negat-
ive? 
This study is part of a broader research project whose ambition is to 
give an answer to these questions, albeit that it may be a provisional one, 
by simultaneously studying the Spanish and Italian cases.8 It represents an 
attempt to face the issue of measuring Spanish protectionism in the long 
term, with the purpose of providing a more rigorous answer to the first 
question raised above. Difficulties in measuring protection have extended 
the traditional methodology for studying tariff laws, the protectionist 
debate and its results. This study, although necessary, is not enough, since 
it may introduce an incorrect vision of the protection that was really 
implemented: changes in tariff laws raising specific tariffs can, paradoxi-
cally, represent a reduction in the nominal protection, given certain con-
ditions in other variables. The first necessary step in the study and analysis 
of protectionism is inevitably measuring nominal ad valorem protection, 
for particular products as well as at the aggregate level, with the objective 
of portraying a comparative perspective of the Spanish experience, as well 
as the study of its effects over the economy.9 
The main technical discussion of this chapter is dedicated to the analy-
sis of a new series of indicators to measure Spanish protectionism in the 
period between 1870 and 1930. These indicators do not, by themselves, 
comprehend the broad topic of protectionism and economic growth, but 
establish a solid base to deepen our knowledge on the level, the changes 
and the nature of the Spanish protectionist profile. 
These indicators are presented in the first section, along with other 
qualitative assessments that appear in the literature. The intention here is 
to openly discuss the contradictions of our current knowledge of the evo-
lution of protectionism in Spain. Recent conventional methods for mea-
suring protection in Spain offer a relatively moderate vision of the Spanish 
protection levels from the beginning of the Restauraci6n, displaying a relat-
ively flat profile during the following years. Agricultural interests would 
have led the years of return to protection in the 1890s and industry would 
have been eventually satisfied only with the 1906 tariff law, some years 
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before the First World War. A new change in the level would come only 
with the Camb6 Tariff in the 1920s.1O 
The second and third are, respectively, dedicated to putting forward 
alternative and more adequate indicators for measuring protection, as 
well as looking at the technical problems and the reliability of the tariff 
average measures for the Spanish case. The fourth section looks over the 
results of all these tests and confirms that the levels of protection in Spain 
were already relatively high at the beginning of the Restauracion, either 
compared with subsequent levels or with other countries. What is 
observed at a later stage is not a flat profile but, instead, one with an 
upward tendency, albeit cyclical in its evolution. The conclusions of this 
chapter discuss previous results and suggest a return to the traditional 
view on the causes of the new industrial protectionist turn of 1891. 
What do we know about the evolution of protectionism in 
Spain? 
The economic indicator that is generally accepted as a good indicator of 
the long-term evolution of the protection level of a given economy is the 
tariff average. This index calculates the percentage of tariff revenue in 
relation to the value of imports (from now on, NT). Another option, more 
dubious but also very extensive because of the simplicity of its computa-
tion, involves estimating the evolution of imports as a percentage of the 
gross national product (GNP), assuming that increases and decreases in 
demand equally affect the numerator and the denominator of this indica-
tor (from now on, OM).u In general terms, both indicators should evolve 
with an inverse trend, that is, when the protection represented by NT 
increases, a contraction in imports greater than that of the GNP can be 
expected, which in turn implies a decrease in OM. Bearing in mind the 
fragility of this relationship, it is interesting to follow the evolution of 
trade policy changes through a systematic comparison of both indicators. 
Figure 13.1 offers a stylised comparison of both indicators in logarith-
mic terms, confirming, to a large extent, the expected negative evolution. 
The most outstanding feature of the 1849 tariff was the reduction in 
the list of prohibited imports and the replacement of ad valorem rights for 
specific ones, which, in the context of a moderate price increase tendency, 
seems to have helped to obtain a more moderate protection level in 
Spanish trade policy in the following years. 12 In the decade of 1850 and 
the first half of the following decade, both indicators coincide in portray-
ing a period of significant liberalisation in tariff protection. The second 
half of the 1860s and the first half of the 1870s is a period of unstable 
maintenance of the previous achievements, despite the fact that the NT 
indicator decreases until 1872. 
The beginning of the Restauracion, with the suspension of the Base 
Quinta13 of July 1875, is depicted by both indicators, respectively, as an 
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Figure 13.1 Changes in the nominal protection (NT) and the degree of openness 
of Spanish imports (sources: Tariff revenue, from Volumenes Anuales 
Estadisticas del Comercio Exterior; Imports, from Tena, 1989; GNP from 
Prados, 1995). 
increase in the level of protection through portraying a contraction in 
imports and an increase in NT. This tendency changes again at the begin-
ning of the 1880s, with a smoothening of NT and a greater openness in 
imports. The impact of the 1891 tariff is clearly detected by the inverse 
behaviour of both indicators, although over a very brief period of time. 
Broadly speaking, one can observe less coherence in the expected behavi-
our of both indicators during the turn of the century, as well as a certain 
difficulty in evaluating the relative importance of the tariff laws of 1891 
and 1906. The effect of the Canovas Tariff of 1891 is significant, although 
it only lasts three years, whilst that of the Salvador Tariff of 1906 seems less 
relevant. Between 1923 and 1926, the indexes show an increase in the 
nominal protection accompanied by a significant contraction of imports. 
The impact of the Camb6 Tariff of 1922 on both indexes lasts a little 
longer but is quite similar to that of the Oinova's Tariff of 189l. 
A further necessary step to avoid blind alleys is to highlight the differ-
ences encountered in the series of tariff revenue and 'special trade' most 
commonly used in the historiography. 
In Table 13.1, the common denominator of all series, excluding that of 
Tirado (1996), refers to import series constructed by Prados de la Esco-
sura and Tena, and presented in Tena (1989). Thus, discrepancies in the 
results of the NT indicator have their origin' in the different sources used 
to obtain the tariff revenue of the numerator. In the cases in which (state) 
budgetary sources have been used, such as in Comfn (1993) or in Mitchell 
(1992), the results obtained show higher levels than in the cases in which 
Spanish protectionism during the Restauraci6n 269 
Table 13.1 Commonly used indexes of nominal protection (NT) (tariff 
revenue/value of imports) 
NT(a) NT(b) NT(c) NT(d) NT(e) 
(Cornin)(%) (Mitchel) (%) (Tirado)( % ) (Esta. Corner) (%) (Tena) (%) 
1877 16.5 16.3 14.0 12.7 12.7 
1889 14.9 14.7 11.3 10.3 11.0 
1897 10.6 10.2 11.0 11.7 14.6 
1913 16.3 15.9 13.4 12.0 14.9 
1926 26.3 25.4 n.a. 23.8 20.1 
Notes 
(a) Comfn (1985); (b) Mitchell (1992); (c) Tirado (1996); DAOMEPON series; (d) Estadisti· 
cas del Comerei/) Exterior, (e) Tena (2001): Tariff revenue data obtained from the database of 
this study, Apendix 13.1. 
it was chosen to use tariff revenue data derived from Spanish trade stat-
istics (Tirado's (c) estimation and (d) and (e), author's calculation).14 
Within each group (budget-based sources or sources based on trade stat-
istics), the levels and evolution are reasonably similar. However, in com-
paring both groups, the perception of the level and the evolution can be 
very different. The first two indicators in Table 13.1 show, generally, 
higher levels than the last two. This happens for every year except for 
1897. This implies that, in the first two cases, the return to protectionism 
appears represented in the year 1877 (the year with the highest protection 
until 1926), whilst in the last two, it seems rather an incremental process 
beginning at the end of the 1880s. 
In any case, whatever NT indicator we use to measure protection in 
Spain, the most relevant characteristic of this indicator is that it shows a 
much higher level and a different profile when compared with the arith-
metic average of a large sample of European countries for which informa-
tion is available. 
As can be seen from Figure 13.2, the Spanish NT displays, in the first 
place, a much higher level, and, additionally, a profile which is more or 
less a concave curve, whose inflexion and lowest level are in the centre. 
This contrasts with the European NT, which is closer to a convex profile 
and whose climax is in the central years of the chosen period. 
May it be said that the evolution of the global level of protection in 
Spain is markedly different to that of most European countries? It is diffi-
cult to answer this question without a study that evaluates and checks the 
accuracy of the NT indicator for Spain as well as for Europe. However, as a 
first approximation, if we suppose that the downward bias of the NT indi-
cator is inversely proportional to its level, the higher Spanish level would 
imply a bigger difference in real terms in favour of Spain. In the Italian 
case, a recent study has confirmed the existence of a moderate profile of 
protection and an acceptable accuracy of the NT indicator.15 The 
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Figure 13.2 Level and profile of nominal protection in Spain and in Europe 
(sources: Spain, Table I; Europe, arithmetic average of the NT of 
Germany, Russia, UK, France, Austria-Hungary (Austria in 1926), Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and 
Portugal (see Federico and Tena, 1998, Appendix Table 4). 
intention of the following pages is to offer a rigorous study of the behavi-
our of the Spanish nominal protection, testing the accuracy of the average 
tariff index. 
How to measure protection 
From the mid-nineteenth century until the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
quotas and other non-tariff barriers were practically non-existent. Com-
mercial policy was based exclusively on tariffs, and therefore, measuring 
the protection level of a particular economy is comparatively simple for 
those years. In principle, a tariff produces the effect of raising the tariff-
setting country's internal price above the international price, in an 
amount equivalent to that of the tariff. 16 The tariff can be expressed as a 
percentage of the international price (ad valorem tariff), or, as in Spain 
and in most continental European countries, as a fixed amount per unit 
of weight (specific tariff). In the latter case it is necessary, for comparative 
purposes, to compute it as 
Ti=Ai/Pi (13.1 ) 
where Ai is the specific tariff and Pi is the international price.17 
In most empirical work, figures on specific tariffs are taken from tariff 
laws. This ex-ante measurement produces some mistakes because of the 
large variety of products imported under special regimes, such as prefer-
ential bilateral agreements or exemptions. For this reason, it is better to 
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use the ad valarem percentages in ex-post terms, as a percentage of the tariff 
revenue and imports values for each product: 
PNi= (Qi*Ai)/(Qi*Pi) (13.2) 
The main problem is how to aggregate the individual protection of 
each product in order to estimate the global protection of an economy. In 
principle, tariffs have to be weighed with the structure of the import 
demand that would have existed under free-trade conditions. This, unfor-
tunately, is not an observable fact. Although some steps have been done in 
the right direction recently, economic theory has not yet provided a satis-
factory alternative. We thus have to offer three alternative weighting 
methods: 
1 To do without the weightings, i.e. no weightings at all - the simple 
tariff average across sectors - as suggested by League of Nations (1927) 
and Liepman (1938): 
UNT=!,T/N 
where Ti= Ail Pi and N= number of products imported or taxed. 
2 The actual structure of imports in the given year: 
(13.3) 
(13.4a) 
where rjis the share of the i-th good in the total amount of imports ex-post 
of the introduction of the tariff. By definition, it can be calculated by 
dividing the total tariff revenue between the total imports. 
NTt= !(~t*Ait)/!(~t*Pjt) (13.4b) 
i=} ;=1 
3 The composition of trade (the structure of imports) of the country a 
year before the introduction of the tariff, as McCloskey suggested (1980): 
(13.5) 
where rti_ 1 is the share of the i-th product in total imports ex-ante the tariff 
introduction. Its calculation would be the following: 
RNTt= ! (Qit- I* Ait) I! (Qit- I * Pit-I) (13.6) 
;=1 i=1 
which is conceptually equivalent to a Laspeyres price index, exactly as NT 
can be assimilated to a Paasche price index. All these alternatives intro-
duce some type of bias. 
The UNT assumes that each imported product has an equal consump-
tion share under free trade, which means that an implausible demand 
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structure is assumed. The greater the disaggregation with which it is calcu-
lated, the smaller the scale of the bias in relation to a free-trade demand. 
The magnitude of the bias is (roughly) inversely proportional to the 
number of products included in the average (Tumlir-Till, 1971), which in 
turn depends on the lay-out of trade statistics. The NT generally causes a 
downward bias in the results, given that tariffs reduce the presence of the 
most protected products in relation to those least protected. In this sense, 
it can be said that the extent of the bias depends on the elasticity of 
imports in those groups of products that have a higher share of the 
demand for imports. 18 
If the elasticity and the quota of the product are significantly high 
enough, an increase in protection may imply a decrease in the NT indicator. 
Equally, a country imposing prohibitive tariffs on all products except one 
(and keeping it with a customs-free access) may appear less protectionist 
than a country imposing a uniform 5 per cent tariff on all its imports. 
Lastly, RNT is possibly the most attractive of all the alternatives offered, if 
only it were possible to find a (not-too-distant) year with a closer free-trade 
import structure. In the Spanish case, finding a free-trade and a not-too-
distant year must be, as of necessity, considered a very approximate task. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no clear and manageable way 
for measuring a country's protection. The indicator that measures the 'true 
protection' of an economy cannot be estimated. Therefore, given that there 
is no ideal solution as yet, the best way forward is to reach a compromise (as 
occurs in all problems concerning index numbers): given the bias intro-
duced by each indicator, the goal must be to try to see if there is a reciprocal 
consistency in the joint interpretation of all the indicators. 
The proposed indexes also offer the possibility of measuring the degree 
of incidence of tariffs, prices and changes in the demand structure on 
changes in the level of protection from one period to the next. Histori-
ography ascribes tariffs a prominent role in most commercial policy 
changes, but this hypothesis has not been tested. The level of protection 
can also vary even if tariffs remain constant, either through changes in the 
composition of trade (as a result of the same commercial policy or other 
reasons), or, with specific tariffs, due to changes in the general price level 
or the relative prices of the different product groups that compose it. 
Therefore, changes in the NT indicator from one period to another 
can be expressed as follows: 
[NT t - NT t_ l ] = [NT t - RNPtl + [RNP t - RNTtl + [RNT,- NT t- 1] 
(13.7) 
where NT is defined as in (13.4b) , RNT as in (13.6) and RNP as: 
RNP t = ! ( Qit- 1 * Ai) /! ( Qit- 1 * Pi) 
i=} i=1 
(13.8) 
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Each component of the right-hand side of the equation measures, ceteris 
paribus, changes in the aggregate protection. The first square brackets 
(the quantity effect) measure the effect of changes in the composition of 
imports on the variation of the NT indicator between two consecutive 
periods (maintaining prices and tariffs constant). The second square 
brackets - the price effect - measure the influence of prices on variations 
of NT (maintaining quantities and tariffs constant). Lastly, the third 
square brackets - the tariff effect - measure the influence of tariff changes 
on variations of NT (maintaining quantities and prices constant, or, in 
other words, maintaining the same structure of imports as in the initial 
period), that is, an approximation to the originally forecasted effect of the 
trade policy.19 
Levels, changes and the singularity of protection during the 
Restauraci6n period 
The years chosen to make this estimation for the Spanish case are 1877, 
1889, 1897, 1913 and 1926. They have been selected on two counts. First, 
in order to minimise the number of years with the condition of being situ-
ated before and after the tariff laws of 1882, 1891, 1906 and 1922. Second, 
so as to work with data from years where the overvaluation and undervalu-
ation of the figures of Spanish statistics would bias as little as possible the 
estimation of the level of nominal protection.20 
From official trade statistics in the chosen years, a detailed correspon-
dence between the Spanish tariff classification of products and the second 
revision of the Standard International Trade Classification of the United 
Nations (SITC) has been carried out for levels of four and five digits. 21 
The (Spanish) annual volumes of trade before 1933 present two different 
denominations or categories: 'general trade' (comercio general) and 'special 
trade' (comercio especial). The first includes all imports for domestic con-
sumption (direct or through free ports). The second also includes prod-
ucts for domestic consumption, but only for those categories with 
customs-free access or through a special tariff regime. In principle, the 
sum of these two categories adjusts itself very well to the modern defini-
tion of 'special trade', and this is the initial sample that has been used.22 
Some products have been left out, either due to technical reasons (the 
type of units in which they were expressed or a lack of correspondence 
with SITC numbers, for example), or due to economic reasons (for 
example, gold items and products imported for monopolistic consump-
tion by the state). As a result, a sample has been obtained which includes 
between 80 per cent and 95 per cent of the total amount of imported 
products registered by trade statistics as total imports, and almost every 
import product dedicated to consumption (with the exclusion of the 
aforementioned group of products due to technical reasons). 
The results of this study are represented in a matrix with 750 rows, 
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corresponding to the same number of SITe four-digit groups. Along with 
the SITe number and the product name, the following information is dis-
played for each of the five years: the number of the tariff classification, the 
value and quantity imported, the tariff revenue obtained for each product 
and the value of the specific tariff that legally corresponds for each year.23 
The prices for each SITe (Pi)) have been computed dividing their value 
by their quantity (Qi)). Likewise, with the tariff revenue and the imported 
quantity, it has been possible to calculate the tariffs really applied to each 
SITe number (Ai)). 
The SITe numbers previously mentioned have been grouped in 
accordance with the GATT (1985/6) classification. This has been done to 
aid understanding and to offer a clearer economic interpretation of the 
estimated protection levels for the different indicators. In this way, it is 
possible to carry out a more rigorous study, using well-defined categories 
with economic sense, grouping the products of the SITe classification into 
the following categories: (1) primary products, (2) semi-manufactured 
goods and (3) industrial manufactures (as well as their subsequent subdi-
visions). The disaggregated results according to the GATT classification of 
the estimations of the NT, UNT and RNT indicators are offered in Table 
13.A1 of the Appendix. 
The global levels of protection of these three indicators are summar-
ised in Table 13.2. The first aspect that needs to be pointed out is the 
coincidence between the expected biases for each indicator and the 
results obtained in the estimation of the different indicators. The UNT 
indicator (tarifflevel without weightings) shows the highest relative values 
for the given years, as usually occurs with this type of indicator.24 The NT 
indicator (representing the weightings of the value of present imports, ex-
post) has the lowest values. The RNT indicator (that weights the tariff with 
the amounts of the year before its introduction, ex-ante) displays mostly 
intermediate values. Broadly speaking, independently from the differ-
ences in the level, the three indicators offer a similar description of the 
evolution and the changes of nominal protection of the Spanish economy. 
Table 13.2 clearly shows that the average profile of the three indicators 
Table 13.2 Total levels of nominal protection in Spain according to different indic-
ators 
NT(J) UNT(2) RNT(3) PROM(4) NT/UNT('5) NT/RNT(6) 
1877 12.7 17.7 n.a. 15.2 0.72 n.a. 
1889 11.0 16.7 12.0 13.2 0.66 0.91 
1897 14.6 26.3 17.8 19.6 0.55 0.82 
1913 14.9 25.2 18.4 19.5 0.59 0.81 
1926 20.1 34.3 33.8 29.4 0.59 0.60 
Source: Appendix 13.l. 
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confirms some features but contradicts others shown in Figure 13.1. The 
result for 1877 confirms the impression that when the Restauraci6n period 
began, the level of protection was already significant.25 It also confirms the 
low level of the year 1889, which highlights the moderate character of the 
General tariff law of 1882, modification of July 1883. and duty reductions 
produced by the eventual extension 01 the trade agreements during the 
1880s. 
The largest contradiction between the new indicators and those of 
Figure 13.1 can be seen for the year 1897. The NT for that year shows a 
moderate (but considerable) increase in relation with 1877 and 1889 
levels of protection. Additionally, the rest of the indicators, and particu-
larly the UNT, show that the NT indicator was particularly undervalued 
for that year. This gives coherence to the abrupt but temporary contrac-
tion that can be observed in Figure 13.1, which is the consequence of a 
decrease in imports of a significant group of products and their gradual 
replacement by other less protected products. The following years main-
tain a similar trend, although the NT is slightly less undervalued, meaning 
that protection in 1913 is maintained and a significant increase can only 
be observed for 1926. 
Table 13.2 suggests that, although the protectionist tendency between 
1877 and 1926 was clearly increasing, the changes in the level of protec-
tion came about in a cyclical fashion, with periods of increase and periods 
of moderation. For the years chosen in this study, a period of moderation 
(1877-89) and a period of relative stability (1897-1913) can be perceived. 
Between both periods comes the 1891 tariff, which gave rise to a signific-
ant change in the level of protection. Something similar occurs with the 
1922 tariff, which raised the level of protection between 1913 and 1926 in 
a similar way. In this sense it is worth keeping in mind that 1897 would be 
low, as a year representative of the given period, whilst 1926 is, on the con-
trary, a high year if we consider the annual series of the NT indicator (see 
Figure 13.1). 
This study confirms the existence of a biased NT indicator, both 
regarding the level as well as the evolution of protection in Spain in the 
years 1877 through to 1926. In this sense, it may be useful to compare the 
UNT indicator of protection (indicator without weightings) of Spain with 
that of another country, like Italy, for which we also have a similar estima-
tion for those same years (see Figure 13.3). The new profile of this figure 
does not substantially change the comments about the singularity of the 
evolution of Spanish protection seen in Figure 13.2. However, it does 
provide some interesting additional information. 
The profile of the Italian NT is similar to that of the European NT, 
unlike the Spanish case. The Spanish NT is higher than the Italian NT for 
every year, except for 1889, when Spanish protection was at its lowest and 
Italian at its highest level. The Spanish NT has a much higher starting 
point in 1877, and although it has a more cyclical profile, it has a growing 
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Figure 13.3 UNT indicator (Unweighted Nominal Protection levels) in Spain and 
Italy 1877-1926 (source: Spain, Appendix 13.1. Italy, see Federico and 
Tena (1998, Table AI, p. 93). 
tendency until 1926. In Spain, years of slight decrease (1889 and 1913) 
are followed by strong increases (1897 and 1922). On the contrary, Italy, 
starting at a low level, undergoes a change of level in 1889 followed by 
some years of moderation (even during the interwar years - until 1926) . 
Although the comparative study with the Italian case deserves, and will 
soon crystallise in, a monographic work, it is worth remembering that the 
Italian NT (as can be expected from a moderate level of protection), in 
contrast to the Spanish one (with a high level of protection), does not 
seem to be affected by a significant downward bias in comparison to the 
UNT and RNT indicators.26 This reaffirms the statement that the observed 
bias in the NT indicator from 1897 onwards is not irrelevant, but is instead 
a consequence of the inability of the NT indicator to capture the import-
ant increase in protection produced from the 1890s onwards. 
The nature and the scope of protection in Spain 
As shown in the first section, historiography has been intensely discussing 
the agricultural or industrial nature of Spanish tariff policy. A first and 
necessary condition to see if there was a tariff strategy favouring industry 
would consist in being able to demonstrate that this sector was more pro-
tected than the primary sector.27 
Table 13.3 clearly shows that, in relative terms, protection apparently pos-
sessed an industrial profile from the beginning of the Restauraci6n in the 
second half of the 1870s. The strong industrial character of 1877 is particu-
larly relevant, as well as the fact that this profile decreases or increases 
accompanying reductions or expansions in the aggregate protection. In this 
way, coinciding with the reduction in the aggregate level of protection in 
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Table 13.3 Relative levels of industrial and non-industrial nominal protection in 
Spain* 
NT UNT RNT PROM NT UNT RNT PROM 
Industrial/non-industrial Industrial/non-industrial (excluding 
colonies) 
1877 135 125 n.a. 129 179 133 n.a. 156 
1889 123 104 70 99 116 106 62 95 
1897 95 131 133 120 87 136 117 113 
1913 91 79 34 68 118 93 49 87 
1926 112 114 116 114 154 130 139 141 
Source: Industrial, manufactures plus semi-manufactures; Non-industrial, primary products. 
See Appendix, Table l. Colonial products eliminated from the listings of the sources of 
Table 13.5. 
the years 1889 and 1913, a loss of sharpness in the industrial profile of pro-
tection can be obseIVed. This sharpness recovers in the moments of greatest 
increase of aggregate protection, as in the years 1897 and 1926. 
For a better understanding of the factors that determine the global 
level of protection and its changes, it is necessary to take a detailed look at 
these main influencing factors. Table 13.Al of the Appendix shows the 
results obtained for NT, UNT, RNT and the arithmetic average of these 
indicators (X). These have been classified using the GATT's classification. 
The profile that the arithmetic average of the indicators (X) shows will 
now be analysed along with the more conventional result offered by the 
weighted indicator of nominal protection (NT). In this sense, the extent 
to which the NT indicator tends to reduce the importance of those prod-
ucts with higher tariffs will be captured by the difference between the NT 
and the other indicators. Table 13.A2 of the Appendix explains the 
changes in the level of the NT indicator between two periods from the 
perspective of the main variables that have an influence on it: import 
demand, price and tariff changes. Consequently, the sectorial results of 
this table will be used to explain the influence of the tariff on changes in 
the import demand. Table 13.A2 of the Appendix corroborates the extent 
to which the difference between NT and X (the average of the three indic-
ators) can be held responsible for the capacity of the tariff to impede the 
entry to those products or groups of products where a heavier tariff was 
levied. 2R 
Primary products 
The NT indicator for primary products (which represent nearly 50 per 
cent of total imports during this period) reveals an increase in protection 
only slightly higher to that of the NT indicator for total imports. That is, a 
moderate protection in 1877 and 1889, a notable increase from 1897 
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onwards, that is maintained stable in 1913 and followed by a moderate 
increase in 1926 (see Table 13.Al of the Appendix). In contrast to total 
imports, the largest differences between protection indices would be 1913 
and not 1897. The average of the indicators in the group of primary prod-
ucts shows a more moderate increment between 1889 and 1897 (29 per 
cent) than in the latter and 1913 (33 per cent). The increase in the pro-
tection of the primary products was even more moderate between 1913 
and 1926 (27 per cent). 
The main culprit of this profile is the most important component, 
foodstuffs, which represent from 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the total 
imports during the period. This group represents agricultural foodstuffs, 
that is, agricultural products not used as primary products by the indus-
trial sector. The NT indicator shows a relatively high protection for food-
stuffs in 1877 (16.8 per cent) and a substantial decrease for 1889 (12.8 per 
cent). Later on, 1897 shows an important increase (18.6 per cent) and 
1913 a smaller one (20.6 per cent), before reaching the 1926 level of 28.1 
per cent. The profile that shows the protection of foodstuffs is radically 
modified if, instead of the NT, the other indicators are used (just as 
happens for primary products). If the average of the three indicators is 
used, the protection of foodstuffs in 1897 (18.9 per cent), although 
slightly superior to that of 1889 (15.4 per cent), remains similar to that of 
1877 (17.8 per cent). In contrast, the average in 1913 (34.2 per cent) 
entails an 80 per cent increase from the 1897 level. This level is main-
tained and consolidated in 1926 (37 per cent). This result suggests an 
undervaluation of the conventional NT indicator for agrarian products 
and highlights the importance of carrying out a more detailed and rigor-
ous analysis in order to explain it. 
The reasons that explain the imperceptible change in the foodstuffs 
group of the NT indicator for the years 1897 and 1913 can be partly clari-
fied by Table 13.A2 of the Appendix. In this table, it can be seen that 
foodstuffs suffered a tariff increase of 22 per cent, and that the shift in the 
imported quantity (-19.7 per cent) is mainly responsible for the NT indi-
cator in these two years, displaying a variation of only 2 per cent. That is, 
the NT indicator of 1913 undeIValues the highest tariffs by weighing them 
with the lower import levels, a problem which the other indicators avoid. 
This can be more closely obseIVed if we pay attention to the relationship 
between the protection increase and the restriction on imports of signific-
ant foodstuffs in 1913, for example wheat flour, canned foodstuffs, milk, 
eggs, fish, lard, wine, liquor, and particularly foodstuffs such as chocolate, 
honey, glucose, sweets and those foodstuffs considered 'colonial' by the 
statistics (sugar, coffee, cocoa and spices).29 
The nominal protection of wheat deseIVes special attention, since, 
given that it represented around 20 per cent of the total agricultural pro-
duction in the first third of the twentieth century, it has monopolised the 
literature's views regarding the changes in agricultural protection during 
Spanish protectionism during the Restauraci6n 279 
the period of study, and especially between 1891 and 1913.30 The tariff 
regime for wheat and its flours was fluctuated greatly between 1892 and 
1913. Therefore, our choice of annual data for measuring protection may 
bias the relative protection of the sector. The data from GHER (1980) 
shows that, if we look at the average customs duties for wheat for the 
periods in which the 1891 and 1906 tariffs were in force, the tariffs on 
wheat were greater from 1906 to 1913 than in the preceding periodY 
Therefore, although the nominal individual protection for the years of 
this study has decreased from 43.7 per cent to 36.4 per cent, these results 
need to be qualified if we take into account the average changes in wheat 
protection during the period 1906--13. 
The fact that the arithmetic average of the indicators presents an 
increase in the protection of foodstuffs between the years 1897 and 1913, 
in spite of the behaviour of the NT indicator, and at the same time that 
other indicators like the evolution of the protection of wheat confirm this 
result, backs the unorthodox hypothesis that the 1906 tariff favoured agri-
cultural interests a lot more than the preceding tariffs. That is, the 1906 
tariff reinforced agricultural protection, in contrast to the 1891 tariff, 
which raised it only slightly from its 1880s level. This merely brought back 
the high protection levels already present in the 1870s. Such an increase 
in the tariffs of foodstuffs was doubtlessly conditioned by the· strong 
increase suffered by the group of so-called 'colonial' products, apparently 
for 'fiscal' (revenue-seeking) reasons, from the 1899 Femandez Villaverde 
reform onwards. What has just been observed is that there was also a tariff 
increase in other agricultural products and that, as a consequence, 
imports contracted, an effect that the NT indicator does not capture. The 
controversy lies partly in the apparent 'fiscal nature' of most parts of the 
agricultural protection that has just been analysed. The protectionist and 
non-fiscal nature of the 1906 and 1911 tariffs will be further analysed in 
the next section. 
Primary products (such as cork, leather, wool, cotton, and so on) and 
minerals offer, as expected, a moderate protectionist profile in all of these 
years. Fuels experience an important increase in protection from 1877 
(9.3 per cent) to 1889 (44.9 per cent), a protection that rises again in 
1897 (50.6 per cent) and that falls again in 1913 to 33 per cent before 
moving up to 45 per cent in 1926 (see Table 13.Al of the Appendix). Coal 
and coke minerals saw their protection double between 1889 (5 per cent 
for both) and 1897 (11.4 per cent and 9.7 per cent, respectively). This 
protection increased again slightly in 1913 (13.5 per cent and 11.4 per 
cent) and in 1926 (14.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent), but the main items 
responsible for the high levels of 1889 and 1897 were crude and rectified 
mineral oils, rectified natural oils and vaseline, which, in 1889, 1897 and 
1913 offer indicators that are, in many cases, above the 100 per cent mark 
in nominal protection, decreasing only in 1926 (33.6 per cent). The fiscal 
motivation behind these tariff increases in mineral and natural oils and its 
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higher or lower protective effect are also a discussion topic in the next 
section. Non-ferrous metals obtain their lowest average protection level in 
1889 (10.9 per cent), an important increase in 1897 (19 per cent), a slight 
reduction in 1913 and a return to a level of around 25 per cent in 1926. 
Semi-manufactures 
Within semi-manufactures, there are two groups of products with an 
important economic significance: the iron and steel industry and a large 
section of the chemical industry. The average indicator for the semi-
manufactures group had its lowest level in 1889 (10.7 per cent). Later on, 
a first important increase of nearly 50 per cent can be observed in 1897 
(15.3 per cent). For 1913, the level is roughly maintained (14.5 per cent), 
followed by a strong increase of nearly 100 per cent in 1926 (30.9 per 
cent). The NT indices in 1897 and 1926 are undervalued in relation with 
the other indices and reduce the increment of protection showed by the 
average of the indicators. 
Among its components, the category for iron and steel shows the 
highest average level of protection (and the most relevant increase as 
well). In 1877 and 1889, beginning from average levels of 20 per cent and 
21.6 per cent, a first increase of over 50 per cent can be observed for 1897 
(33.5 per cent). In 1913, the protection of iron and steel slightly decreases 
(27.1 per cent), a tendency which is broken with an increase of over 100 
per cent in the result for 1926 (54.8 per cent). In this case, the NT indica-
tor for iron and steel presents a higher profile than the average of the 
indicators in the years 1889 and 1913, and a lower profile than this 
average for 1897 and 1926. In the explanation of the increases of the NT 
indicator between 1889 and 1897, Table 13.A2 of the Appendix highlights 
again the contraction of the imported quantities (-4.2 per cent). This 
means that the NT indicator (as in previous occasions) tends to have a 
downward bias in the protection increases in iron and steel, as a con-
sequence of the tariff laws of 1891 and particularly the law of September 
1896.32 
Chemical products had a much more moderate protection, especially 
before 1926. The average of the indicators displays a moderate profile, 
starting at 9.5 per cent in 1877, decreasing to 7.6 per cent in 1889, increas-
ing then to 9.6 per cent in 1897 and 11.5 per cent in 1913. Table 13.A2 of 
the Appendix captures a strong contractive effect of imports between 1913 
and 1926, and a somewhat less important one between 1897 and 1913. 
Likewise, the average of the indicators (11.5 per cent and 28 per cent) 
moves away from the conventional NT indicator (6.7 per cent and 10 per 
cent) in the respective years. This demonstrates that there was a strong 
contraction of imported quantities of heavily protected chemical products 
in 1926 as well as in 1913 (although to a lesser extent). 
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Finished manufactured goods 
Manufactures do not have such a stable profile as semi-manufactures 
between 1877 and 1913, although they end up in a similar level in 1926. 
They begin with a significantly higher level in 1877 (20 per cent), go 
through a strong decrease and a strong increase (14.8 per cent and 25.8 
per cent in 1889 and 1897, respectively), and, in contrast with the stability 
displayed by semi-manufactures, in 1913 industrial manufactures show a 
significant reduction of the tariff average (15.8 per cent). While semi-man-
ufactures have their highest tariff protection in 1926 (31 per cent), manu-
factures display a 32 per cent protection, only slightly higher than the 
1897 level (25.8 per cent). 
The most significant difference between the NT indicator and the rest 
of the indicators occurs precisely in 1897 (once again, the year that the 
average has the highest protection increase of the period). Table 13.A2 of 
the Appendix sheds light on the important contraction of the demand for 
imports that joins the significant protection increase between the years 
1889 and 1897. Thus, both the contraction of the demand and the differ-
ential of NT with the average of the three alternative indicators point out 
the strong contraction in imports, as a consequence of a significant 
increase in industrial protection from 1889 to 1897. On the contrary, from 
1897 to 1913, Table 13.A2 of the Appendix shows a significant tariff 
decrease along with an increase in the price of manufactures, reinforcing 
a general decrease in the nominal protection levels of manufactures for 
1913. As highlighted in Table 13.4, there seems to be little doubt that 
industrial products achieved less (relative and absolute) protection with 
the 1906 tariff than they achieved with the 1891 and 1926 tariffs, indepen-
dently from the chosen indicator. 
Among the industrial manufactures, group 3.1, 'capital goods', has the 
peculiarity of beginning with a lower protection (13.5 per cent in 1877) 
than the rest of manufactures, but nevertheless ending with a similar level 
(31.4 per cent in 1926). Between these two years, the level diminishes in 
1889 (9.3 per cent), increases in 1897 (16.3 per cent), and is reduced 
again slightly in 1913 (13.9 per cent). Capital goods only have a strong 
increase in protection after the First World War. The category 'other 
capital goods' (including pieces and tools of iron, electrical material, 
steam engines and measuring machines) and the category 'specific indus-
trial machinery' are the most important components of the group of 
imported capital goods and play the leading role in causing a certain con-
traction in the demand in 1913, thus maintaining a similar profile to their 
aggregate.33 
Group 3.1, 'consumption goods', displays a different evolution to 
capital goods, starting off at a much higher level (21.9 per cent in 1877) 
and reaching a similar level (33 per cent in 1926). In the middle of the 
period, protection is reduced slightly (16.6 per cent in 1889) and then 
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grows again (nearly doubling to 30.1 per cent in 1897). Table 13.A2 of the 
Appendix explains the cause of this strong increment of industrial con-
sumer protection between 1889 and 1897, which is mainly due to a strong 
tariff increase. In 1897 the differential of the NT indicator with the rest of 
indicators is quite impressive and very is well explained in Appendix 132 
through the significant demand contraction (-8.3 per cent). This crowd-
ing-out effect on the demand in 1897 can be clearly observed in the case 
of textiles, one of its principal components. With a tariff increase of 16.4 
per cent and a demand contraction of 8.4 per cent, textiles are, along with 
'other consumer goods', the most affected by the undervaluation of the 
NT indicator for the year 1897. The demand contraction seems gener-
alised between 1889 and 1897, with textiles dropping from 13.2 per cent 
to 7.6 per cent of total Spanish imports. The average of the indicators 
shows how textiles, starting with a high level of protection (22.9 per cent 
in 1877, similarly to their aggregate), moderate this level in 1889 (17.3 per 
cent), reach their maximum in 1897 (32.9 per cent), later drop back 
down in 1913 (19.3 per cent) to finish off in 1926 with a similar, though 
slightly smaller, result than in 1897 (30.7 per cent). The 'clothing 
industry' shares with 'fabrics and threads' a high starting point in 1877 
(22.6 per cent), but, as in the case of steel, chemistry and capital goods, 
reaches its maximum level at the end of the period, in 1926 (40.9 per 
cent). 
To sum up: nominal protection levels in Spain at the end of the 1870s 
were relatively high, either compared with subsequent national levels or 
with other countries. This high starting point can be specially attributed to 
the prominent role of the protection of consumption manufactures 
before the Restauraci6n. The decade of the 1880s brings about a decrease 
in protection due to the combined effects of the 1882 tariff, the extension 
of preferential agreements and the 1883 law. Later on, keeping in mind 
the high starting point of the 1870s, it can be argued that nominal protec-
tion in Spain has it most important break-off after the 1891 tariff law was 
set. The magnitude of this tariff increase depends on the type of indicator 
used. Nevertheless, in relative terms, there is no doubt that the 1891 tariff 
represented a significant protection increase and that this increase was 
lead by the industrial manufactures. The 1906 tariff maintains the level of 
protection, in global terms; protection only increasing again significantly 
in 1926. 
The stabilisation of protection in 1906 is the result of two opposite 
tendencies; on the one hand, the significant moderation in the protection 
of industrial manufactures. On the other, the equally important increase 
in the protection of agricultural products. The 1922 tariff maintains the 
protection obtained by the agricultural products and recovers the protec-
tion lost by industrial manufactures with the 1906 tariff. Thus, in relative 
terms, the 1891 and the 1922 tariffs gave the industry a higher nominal 
protection whilst, on the contrary, the 1906 tariff gave it to agricultural 
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products (particularly foodstuffs). The design of the industrial protection 
implemented by the 1891 and 1922 tariff laws had some important differ-
ences: whilst the first one mainly protected traditional industries such as 
textiles and iron, the second was targeted particularly towards those man-
ufacturing sectors that produce finished goods (clothing and other con-
sumption manufactures) and to the new sectors (chemistry, capital goods 
and machinery). 
The importance of the 'quantity, price and tariff effects' on the 
changes in nominal protection have been analysed from the data of Table 
13.A2 of the Appendix. The price increase played a buffering role only in 
the period 1913-22, and this affected all sectors except capital goods. In 
contrast, in the period 1897-1913, the price effect worked in favour of the 
protection increase in manufactures and semi-manufactures. The tariff 
increases were the main causes of the upward tendency of protection in all 
the periods and in most sectors, with the exception of the 1877-89 period 
in which nominal protection was moderate. The other counter-vailing 
effect during 1897-1913 came from semi-manufactured imports in addi-
tion to the role played by other types of manufactures. In this period, an 
important decrease in tariffs occurred in both sectors (more markedly in 
consumption goods, machinery, and iron and steel), counteracted by the 
prominence of tariffs in the primary sector, or, more precisely, foodstuffs. 
The 'quantity effect' is negative for all periods and thus tends to moderate 
the final increase in the NT indicator. This negative effect reflects, on the 
one hand, the changes in preferences and in the prices of the products. 
On the other, it also reflects the effect produced by the tariff, shifting 
demand towards less-protected products. That is, it serves as an indicator 
of the accuracy, and extends undervaluation problems of, the NT indica-
tor for certain sectors. 
The greatest differences among alternative indicators have been found 
in the years where significant tariff increases have been accompanied with 
import contractions. This is particularly obvious for manufactures 
(particularly in consumption manufactures) in 1897, for primary products 
(especially in foodstuffs) in 1913, and for semi-manufactures (especially 
for chemical products) in 1926. In all these cases, the rest of the indicators 
corroborate an undervaluation of the NT indicator as a consequence of 
the import crowding-out effect from high to low dutiable imports. There-
fore, as expected, the conventional NT indicator biases the results, in 
most cases moderating the increases of nominal protection regarding 
their theoretical projected values. In this sense, the availability of other 
indicators allows us to offer alternative and more reliable interpretations 
to those that have been regularly presented by the historiographic 
literature. 
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The fiscal and agricultural components of the 1906 tariff 
The literature agrees in underlining how, due to the loss of Cuba the 
group of 'colonial imports' (Le. colonial foodstuffs) concentrated the 
interests of the reformers in view of acquiring new sources of revenue, as 
the tariff reform introduced by Fernandez Villaverde in 1899 shows.34 
What follows is an analysis of the weight (and therefore, of the effects) of 
the so-called 'fiscal tariffs' in the changes of the composition of protection 
between the 1891 and the 1906 tariff laws. 
The previous section highlighted the significant protection increase in 
favour of the agricultural sector in comparison with the industrial manu-
factures in 1913 (both in relative and absolute terms). First, therefore, it is 
necessary to assess to what extent this occurs as a consequence of tariff 
increments for 'colonial products'. Second, the complementarities 
between the fiscal reasons (which tend to increase tariffs in some products 
as a source of income) and the protectionist effects on the economy are to 
be discussed. 
Table 13.4 summarises the strong protective increase that the so-called 
colonial products suffered between 1897 and 1913, as well as how their 
low elasticity of demand allowed an important improvement of the tariff 
revenue obtained by the group. Both the revenue and the tariff rate 
(measured by the NT) were multiplied by a factor of (nearly) ten, which 
means that the level of the imports of the group remained practically con-
stant. The revenue of dutiable colonial products represented nearly one-
third of the total revenue increase in 1913.35 
The previous section allowed us to check that the use of other indic-
ators apart from the NT highlighted the existence of a strong swing in the 
protectionist policy between the Canovas and Salvador tariffs, turning 
from manufactures to agricultural foodstuffs. Two small tests will now be 
carried out to evaluate the role of the supposed 'fiscal' intentions, to see 
their importance on the changes in the protection that occurred between 
1897 and 1913. To do this, a simple hypothetical scenario will be 
Table 13.4 Changes in protection and tariff revenue from 'colonial products' 
1897 
1913 
'Colonial' 
NT(%) 
7.4 
67.9 
Total 
NT(%) 
14.6 
14.9 
Source: Estadisticas del Comercio Exterior. 
Notes 
Colonial products tariff 
revenue (millions ptas) 
3.0 
30.3 
Total tariff revenue 
(millions ptas) 
105.4 
189.6 
Colonial group composed in 1897 by: foreign sugar, glucose, liquid caramel, colonial sugar, 
foreign cocoa, colonial cocoa, ground cocoa, foreign coffee, colonial coffee, ground coffee, 
Ceylan cinnamon, other cinnamons, cloves, nutmegs with and without, pepper, tea, vanilla. 
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developed with the intention of testing what would have happened to the 
relative protection between the main sectors concerned if tariffs on this 
group of products (characterised as 'fiscal' by the literature) had been 
maintained equal between 1897 and 1913 - the contrafactual which 
cannot be applied to the foodstuffs sector. 
The results presented in Table 13.5 clearly show that the so-called colo-
nial products played an important role for explaining the abrupt change 
from a tariff structure visibly favourable to industrial products to one that 
strongly favoured agricultural products in the Spanish tariff policy. 
Section (a) shows what really happened (including colonial products) and 
therefore offers the same results already discussed in the previous section. 
Section (b) explains what would have happened in 1913 if the tariffs on 
colonial products had been maintained as in 1897 (assuming a constant 
demand as well). Section (c) simulates what would have happened with 
the relative protection indicators if colonial products had been absent on 
both years. The last two sections of this chapter reduce the (net) average 
level of protection in 1913, offering for foodstuffs a similar level of protec-
tion as in 1897. 
If we assume that colonial products are mainly 'fiscal products', without 
protective effects, and that they should therefore be excluded from the 
calculation of the protection, the conclusions are as follows. First, it can be 
observed that the group of colonial products increases the total level of pro-
tection by three percentage points in 1913, whilst it would reduce it slightly 
in 1897. Second, the exclusion or the maintenance of tariff rates on colonial 
products allows us to observe that the (important) group of non-colonial 
foodstuffs at least maintained its level of protection between these two 
periods. If we add to this the significant loss of protection of the manufactur-
ing sector between these years, there is no doubt that the 1906 tariff 
improved the relative position of the agricultural sector (in comparison with 
the manufacturing sector). The most significant fact that this test proves is 
that, whether we take the extreme assumption of excluding colonial prod-
ucts or not, the decrease in the protection level of manufactures appears to 
be the most relevant factor when it comes to explaining the relative improve-
ment of the protection of the agricultural sector between 1897 and 1913. 
Although the literature has focused on the colonial products, the char-
acterisation of the so-called revenue-generating products (on which tariffs 
are levied with the aim of increasing revenue and not for protecting any 
products) is a wider matter. The problem lies in the fact that any product 
of general consumption with a high tariff and a low and elastic demand 
may be considered a fiscal product (as occurred with wheat in 1906).36 In 
addition, both groups of products have direct or indirect effects on 
welfare. The inclusion or non-inclusion of exotic products in the total 
tariff average is part of a recent debateY The existence of some domesti-
cally produced substitutes of colonial products allows us to suggest that 
some exotic imported products are more fiscal than others. This is quite 
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Table 13.6 Impact of the exclusion of a group of 'fiscal products' on the relative 
protection indicators (arithmetic average of the NT, UNT and RNT 
indicators) 
a) Fiscal goods included b) Fiscal goods excluded 
Food Mfr· Total Food Mfr· Total 
(1) (2) (3) (1) -7- (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) -7- (2) 
1897 18.9 25.8 19.6 0.73 21.1 25.8 19.1 0.82 
1913 34.2 15.9 19.5 2.2 30.7 15.9 17.5 1.9 
Source: Simulation based on the same database used in Table 13.3. 
an arbitrary decision, but is based on an intuitive economic criterion, 
rather than on an administrative one.3S 
This last exercise confirms, on general terms, the reflections that arose 
from the exclusion of colonial products in Table 13.6. With the excluded 
fiscal products, some agricultural products with high tariffs but without 
domestic production are maintained. Obviously, this implies that agricul-
tural protection in 1913 was even more important than in Table 13.5. 
Consequently, Table 13.6 confirms that, between 1897 and 1913, an 
increase in the nominal agricultural protection existed not only for the 
group of agricultural consumption products, but also for the selected 
group of imported agricultural products (without domestic production). 
Hence, this second test supports the hypothesis of the existence of a 
change in favour of agriculture in relation to the previous period, in 
absolute terms and in relation to industry. 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented in the previous sections partly contradicts some 
of the firmly held opinions of the recent literature over the profile and 
evolution of tariff protection in Spain during the Restauraci6n period. This 
study is the first to offer a global vision of the evolution of nominal protec-
tion using a new group of alternative indicators, both at an aggregate and 
inter-sectoriallevel. The new indices show that: 
The conventional tariff average, weighted by imports, produces a 
downward bias on Spain's general nominal protection profile during 
the Restauraci6n period. 
2 This bias particularly affects manufactures, as may be reasonably 
expected, because of their higher demand elasticity. 
3 The downward bias is bigger for the periods after the main tariff laws 
that increased the protection of manufactures, as shown by the results 
for 1897 and 1926, years which respectively follow the 1891 and 1922 
tariff reforms by Canovas del Castillo and Camb6.39 
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4 The tariff law of 1906 moderates the protection of manufactures and 
increases that of foodstuffs. The former comes about because of the 
price increase of manufactures, combined with the more moderate 
tariffs on these. The latter, because of the increment of agricultural 
tariffs, combined with strong increases of tariffs on exotic products 
(for fiscal reasons) during the turn of the century. 
It may be advanced that a future study will present indicators of effect-
ive protection whose results on relative sectorial protection are very 
similar to those presented here.40 Estimations have been made only for a 
few years, but a projection of the estimated biases over the whole period 
allows the following reasonable hypotheses to be made. 
Although protection after 1875 follows a cyclical upward profile, not 
every cycle is equal. The most marked one comes after a period of a 
certain protectionist moderation in the 1880s, with the arrival of the 
Canovas tariff of 1891. The 1906 tariff seems to maintain protection, 
which then continues its upward tendency from the 1920s onwards with 
the 1922 tariff, although this second cycle has a smoother profile than that 
observed for the 1890s. 
Broadly speaking, it can be said that protection during the whole 
period of the Restauraci6n has a markedly industrial bias. This can be 
traced back to its beginning in 1877. The moderation or accentuation of 
this industrial bias seems to be connected to the decrease or increase of 
the general level of aggregate protection: industry clearly wins with those 
tariffs that raise protection, whilst agriculture does it with those that relax 
it. Although protection during the Restauraci6n had an industrial nature, 
the Canovas tariff of 1891 had a much higher industrial bias than the Sal-
vador tariff of 1906, contrary to what most recent studies maintain. 
These facts, which have been here contrasted, raise doubts on certain 
widespread hypotheses in the Spanish historiography. The continuity of 
the industrial nature highlighted in this study clashes head-on with the 
interpretation of the 'forceful' or 'fortuitous' nature of the protectionist 
turn of 1891 which has been very popular recently amongst Spanish eco-
nomic historians. 41 This conclusion does not contradict the importance of 
the efforts of the Spanish Administration in defence of the exporter's 
interests, nor with the fact that the failure of negotiations with France 
played a role in reinforcing the positions of the protectionist industrial 
sectors. The negotiation of the trade agreement with France doubtlessly 
influenced the design of the 1891 tariff, but other forces determined its 
final configuration by stressing its industrial nature and maintaining it for 
such a long period of time.42 
The facts show that, while the Salvador tariff of 1906 readjusted itself 
and slightly moderated industrial protection, agricultural products gained 
a certain prominence. This came about through an increase in the 
number and the level of protected products, as well as from the significant 
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increase in the protection of the so-called colonial products. This con-
firms that, in both cases, increases in the protection of primary products 
came about because of the growing state pressure to raise more revenue 
after the Villaverde reform of 1899. That the fiscal pressure contributed to 
increasing agricultural tariffs does not mean that it was a primary factor 
for determining the nature of Spanish protectionism at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Proof of this is given by the Camb6 tariff of 1922, 
where the generalised tariff increase stands out in all sectors and in the 
renewed prominence of the industrial tariff. 
Therefore, there was certain continuity in the protectionist policy of 
the Restauracion before and after the 1891 C<'inovas tariff, and, contrary to 
what has been generally believed until recently, the evidence points 
towards the strengthening of the idea that Spanish protection had, to a 
large extent, an industrial bias from the beginning of the given period. 
This opens up the discussion of the greater or smaller degree of con-
tinuity of the protective level of the Spanish economy between the Restau-
racion and the Sexenio Liberal (1868-74) thus raising the question of 
whether the international turnaround from Base Quinta to the Figuerola 
tariff and its repeal in 1875 materialised in actual fact. 
Consequently, the traditional hypothesis suggested by Vicens Vives 
seems strengthened; namely, that the 1891 Canovas tariff reinforced the 
interests of the traditional industrial sectors of textiles and steel (the 
former in 1891 and the latter particularly after 1896), and that these 
sectors led the coalition with the agricultural representatives.43 There is no 
doubt that many unintentional factors, such as trade relations, fiscal needs 
or the economic climate, influence the decision-making process of devis-
ing tariff structures, and that all these factors contribute to weaken or 
strengthen the various conflicting interest groups. The political mechan-
ism that gave rise to this result, through pressure from the main interest 
groups or from the lack of it, is without any doubt one of the most inter-
esting debates that this research opens up. 
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Notes 
Parts of this chapter have been presented in different versions at various semi-
nars: at the International University Menendez y Pelayo, the Fifth Congress of 
the Association of Economic History, the Eleventh International Economic 
History Association Congress and at the universities of Valencia and Carlos III 
of Madrid. I am very grateful for the comment and critique of, amongst others, 
Concha Beltran, Giovanni Federico, Pedro Fraile, Agustfn Llona, Elena 
Martfnez, Jordi Palafox, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Pablo Sanchez Lean 
and Daniel Tirado, as well as for the useful comments of an anonymous 
referee. I cannot leave out my most sincere thanks to Laura Cervero, 
Raimundo Fermindez Cuesta and Cristina Cambeiro for their collaboration in 
the preparation of the database. This project has been financed with a scholar-
ship of the Spanish Ministry of Education CGYCIT: PB 94/073. This is a revised 
version (February 2005) of the article published in Spanish by Revista de Histo-
ria Econ6mica 3 (1999), pp. 579-621. Translation financed by SEJ2004-05894 
MEC. Translator: Alejandro Dfaz Blanco. 
2 As Raymond Carr points out, 'the demand for protectionism was only one 
aspect of the economic pessimism that followed the end of the boom of the 
Restauraci6n' (Carr, 1990: 381, translated from the Spanish edition). This pes-
simism is shared by the literature in arguing against alternatives to protection-
ism. 
3 'It was inconceivable that politicians would risk the political and social con-
sequences of sacrificing the Castilian agriculture and the Basque industry' 
(Carr, 1990: 381, translated from the Spanish edition). 
4 Perhaps Flores de Lemus' protectionist position was one of the most conscien-
tious of the costs implied. He highlighted many times that industrial protection 
was not for free and was paid by the agricultural exporters. His preoccupation 
for the rhetoric position of 'integral protectionism' has been pointed out many 
times, given that this implied excessive protectionist measures that damaged 
the agricultural exports without increasing the effective protection of the 
industry. In essence, however, he shared the pessimist position that the indus-
try would disappear without protection, and thus favoured such measures. 'So 
abolish that agricultural export industry and all that stuff and the industrial 
constitution of Biscayans and Catalans will collapse. But destroy the Basque 
Country and Catalonia and you shall see what happens to Spanish 
agriculture .. .', only to continue saying 'With the construction of this combina-
tion of industry and export-oriented agriculture, each of the farmers that pay 
the protection will naturally have less than if that protection did not exist. But, 
altogether, they will have more than if the industry did not exist. And 
altogether with the Nation and Fatherland' (Flores de Lemus, 1928: 42). 
5 Vicens Vives tends to present a somewhat positive image of the return to pro-
tectionism, portraying its reinforcement as inevitable. Regarding the 1891 
tariff, he states that: 'The development of the iron and steel industry and the 
best moments of the textile industry came about under this protectionist 
regime ... the loss of the colonies forced Spain to defend itself, and it should 
not be considered odd that on March 3rd 1906, a clearly protectionist tariff was 
approved in Spain' (Vicens Vives, 1990: 645, translated from Spanish). Follow-
ing this line, Josep Fontana also maintains a firm position regarding the 
inevitability of the protection: 'Perhaps the main problem was not the protec-
tion itself, but instead its reinforcement, when it would have been more posit-
ive to gradually reduce it' (Maluquer, 1987: 71, translated from Spanish). Later 
on he confirms the impossibility of reducing the tariff rate with the 1906 tariff: 
'The trajectory followed by the Spanish economy in the years 1898-1921 and 
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the economic policy that implemented it responded to almost inevitable con-
straints. There was probably no alternative.' Nevertheless, he ended up reckon-
ing that 'the costs of the nationalist option were probably excessively high' 
(ibid.: 99). 
6 See Tortella (1994), Prados (1982, 1988), Carreras (1984), Fraile (1991), Tena 
(1992a, 1995). 
7 See the studies of Cost as (1988), Serrano Sanz (1989) and Sabate (1996). 
8 The project began with the Spanish case study (see Prados and Tena, 1994) 
and it will hopefully conclude with a summary of all the research in Tena 
(1999). The Italian case study began at a later stage, but has already given rise 
to some publications (see Federico and Tena, 1998). 
9 The first version of this measurement can be seen in Prados and Tena (1994). 
For an alternative annual indicator, see Tirado (1994). A critique of the latter 
can be found in Tena and Tirado (1996). 
10 See the studies of Costas (1988), Serrano Sanz (1987, 1989), Tirado (1994) 
and Sabate (1996). 
11 Demand is normally closely correlated with GDP, but not always. 
12 The price index of English exports to Spain, constructed by Prados de la Esco-
sura, rises from 100 in 1850 to 115 in 1864 (Prados, 1988, Table 5-A2: 257). See 
also elArancel (1960: 21). 
13 The Base Quinta is section number 5 of the regulation plan of the 1869 
Figuerola Tariff law. It compelled increasing reductions of tariffs after 1875, 
enforcing that the maximum tariff on every item would not be more than 15 
per cent (ad valorem level) in 1881. It was never implemented because of the 
Restauracion of King Alfonso XII six months before the July 1875 deadline and 
it was repealed. 
14 In principle, customs income from budgetary sources is consolidated but 
includes export rights, as well as other charges and taxes which are not strictly 
customs-based. This is reflected in a higher level. 
15 Federico and Tena (1998). 
16 In principle, the difference between both prices may be less than the total 
amount of the tariff (so-called watered protection). However, this case does not 
usually create empirical problems for estimating protection, since these types 
of goods are not imported due to their higher price in comparison with 
domestic production. 
17 Anderson (1995) and Feenstra (1995) have argued in favour of estimating pro-
tection on the base of domestic prices inclusive of tariffs, i.e. Pi = Ail (Pi + Ai). 
The difference is small when tariffs are not too high. Nevertheless, leaving 
aside the traditional definition would imply not being able to compare the 
results of the estimation with those of most other authors, both for the Spanish 
case and for other countries. 
18 For the bias to be relevant, the fact that the product represents a significant 
share of total imports is a necessary but not sufficient condition. This is 
because, if elasticity is low enough, a significant tariff increase may not signific-
antly affect the imported quantity. 
19 A similar system, though applied to continuous time-series, has been recently 
used by Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998). However, their approach is method-
ologically less ambitious, since it only considers the price and tariff effects, 
whilst our main interest is to capture the effect of import shifts. 
20 For the years under consideration, the estimated aggregate bias is 8.5 per 
cent for 1877, 4.7 per cent for 1889, 0.8 per cent for 1897, -10.5 per cent for 
1913 and -7.7 per cent for 1926. A relatively moderate bias has also been 
estimated for both primary and manufactured products: in 1877, 8.4 per cent 
for primary products and 17.7 per cent for manufactures; in 1889, 6.5 per 
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cent and 9.4 per cent respectively; in 1897,5.6 per cent and -0.6 per cent; in 
1913, -11.0 per cent and -4.5 per cent; and, in 1926, -7.7 per cent and 
-8.5 per cent. The origin of the biases in the valuations of the products may 
be attributed to the suspicion that protectionist groups raised the valuations 
of manufactured goods with the objective of obtaining an ad valorem nominal 
protection more moderate than the real protection. This overvaluation has 
only been detected for the years preceding 1896. Concerning manufactures, 
for the years of this study, only 1877 seems relevant, since the bias for 1889 is 
small, being negative in other years. The fact that the global bias for manu-
factures was negative does not however exclude the fact that, within the 
group of manufactured products, some especially influential pressure groups 
may have attained overvaluations that were greater than average. A study of 
the revaluation of manufactures, or especially of those where the risks of a 
bias are greater, can be justified on the following counts: 1) the difficulty in 
obtaining international prices homogenous to those of our statistics for a 
wide variety of manufactured products (reasons stated by all Spanish authors 
that have worked on this topic); 2) if the biases expected in the historio-
graphic literature are the product of pressure groups, these can only be 
upward biases, and, in that case, the results of this study would offer an esti-
mation of the nominal protection in accordance with the interest of these 
pressure groups, that is, more moderate than the real bias. Departing from 
the supposition that there are good reasons to believe that the biases in the 
valuations do not have a homogenous tendency and that it is necessary and 
possible to individually re-valuate each product, an alternative way can be 
chosen (see Tirado, 1994). A critique of this alternative attempt can be found 
in Tena and Tirado (1996). 
21 The correspondence has been introduced into the database for a level of five 
digits, with the intention of obtaining a reliable correspondence for the aggre-
gation of three digits. This task was carried out with the systematic use of the 
United Nations dictionary (1985), which, departing from the name and 
characteristics of a product, allows a match with a five-digit number from the 
SITC classification, second revision, for each product included in the Volumenes 
Anuales del Comercio Exterior (Annual Volumes of [Spanish] Trade) for the five 
years chosen. 
22 Temporary trade (comercio temporal) and returned merchandises (mercader£as 
devueltas) have been excluded when they are identifiable in the statistics, as 
occurs for the years 1889, 1897 and 1913. For the year 1926, series of 'general' 
and 'special' trade seem to already exclude these two concepts with greater 
rigour. 
23 For 1877, products included in the statistics were not corresponded with the 
tariff classification number, as was subsequently done. In the year 1926, the 
statistics do not display tariff revenue for each product, so tariff revenues have 
been estimated from the second column of specific tariffs published in 1925, 
that is, those available on 1926 for their application (Consejo de Economia 
Naciona~ 1925), which include all the tariffs lowered after the end of the nego-
tiation of trade agreements (carried out between 1921 and 1924). 
24 See League of Nations (1927), Tumlir and Till (1971). 
25 Compare as well the low level obtained for these same indicators in the Italian 
case for that same year, 1877 (NT: 7.3 per cent; UNT: 6.3 per cent). Statistical 
Appendix, Federico and Tena (1998). 
26 See Federico and Tena (1998, figure 1: 79), and Chapter 6 in this volume. 
27 Although it is generally assumed that the relationship between the increase of 
the sectorial product and its level of protection have a linear relation, this need 
not always be the case (Anderson, 1994). 
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28 The disaggregated information of all the products included in the estimation, 
along with the denomination of their ad valorem protection and their import-
ance (arranged in accordance to their SITC within the GATT classification), is 
available in paper format on request. For any other queries, please contact the 
author. 
29 The nominal protection of wheat flour changed from 31.4 per cent to 41.7 per 
cent between 1897 and 1913, causing a reduction from 3.57 per cent to 0 per 
cent of total imports. Meats and canned foodstuffs increased their protection 
from 17.7 per cent to 33.1 per cent in those same years, thus reducing their 
percentage over total imports from 0.4 per cent to 0.08 per cent. Cane and 
brown sugar saw their nominal protection increase from 0.44 per cent to 110 
per cent, whilst their weight over total imports shrank from 2.02 per cent to 
0.01 per cent. Water, and wine and liquor, saw their percentages change, 
respectively, from 18.2 per cent to 32.9 per cent and from 0.37 per cent to 0.2 
per cent. See Appendix 13.2 for the disaggregation of the results of Table 13.3 
(given their extension, they are not presented here, but are available to any 
reader that requests them). 
30 Simpson (1996) estimates that wheat represents, on average, approximately 20 
per cent of agricultural production for some years of the period 1890-1932. 
The fourth chapter of the GHER (1980) book probably remains the best quan-
titative study available of the evolution of agricultural tariff and non-tariff pro-
tection until the First World War. 
31 The arithmetic average of the tariffs on wheat for the period 1892-1905 was 6.7 
Pesetas per hectolitre, and for the 1897 tariff it was 8.19. For the period 
1906-13, the average was 7.39, and for the 1913 tariff it was 6.93 (averages cal-
culated from GHER, 1980, Table 14: 96). 
32 From the General Railway Law of 1855 until the tariff law of September 1896, 
most of the railway equipment enjoyed a special tariff system, with reduced 
duties in comparison with the other categories of iron and steel. In 1897, 
although most of the railway equipment was maintained within the category of 
'special trade', the privileges of this group were reduced and they suffered a 
considerable tariff increase (for example, in 1896 the bars and the rails 
covered by 'special trade' had an ad valorem protection of 13.8 per cent, whilst 
in 1897 it had risen to 28.8 per cent; linking metallic parts rose from 12 per 
cent to 53 per cent). Due to the changes introduced by the 1896 law, the year 
1897 cannot be considered a representative year regarding what occurred with 
railway equipment between 1892 and 1896. But, in contrast, the following ten 
years until 1906 can be considered as such. The changes in tariffs introduced 
in September 1896 in relation to the 1891 and previous tariffs can be seen in 
Aran Perez (1988: 8). Discounts and franchises for railway equipment were 
included within 'general trade' in the year 1877. In 1889 and 1897, these privi-
leges began to be registered under an entry called 'special trade', and non-priv-
ileged railway equipment became incorporated with the rest of the 'general 
trade'. 
33 A study of the levels of protection and imports of electric machinery and 
materials between 1890 and 1935 can be seen in Tena (1988). 
34 See Sabate (1996) and Comin (1993). 
35 Sabate (1996) quantifies the contribution of the increase in revenue from colo-
nial goods between 1895-9 and 1900-4 in 7 per cent of the total ordinary 
revenue of the state. In this case, the contribution to total revenue is 32 per 
cent, although the period considered here is different, between 1897 (two 
years before the Villaverde reform) and 1913 (a year in which the 10 pesetas 
per kilo surcharge applied by the law of 24 December 1912 on colonial prod-
ucts, excluding sugar, influenced the results heavily). 
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36 Traditionally, some scholars believe that it is necessary to exclude the so-called 
revenue-generating products from the estimates of nominal protection, since 
their introduction is mainly due to fiscal rather than protectionist reasons. 
That the legislator declares a fiscal intention when imposing a tariff does not 
mean that the tariff has no protectionist consequences. Some of the revenue-
generating products were domestically produced or had close direct substi-
tutes. In other cases (that is, when products were not domestically produced 
and had no close substitutes) the consequences of a tariff only affected con-
sumer welfare (directly) and the allocation of resources (indirectly). The 
former, through decreasing their income, and the latter, by incentivating the 
production of direct substitutes (for example, a high tariff on coffee, cocoa or 
cinnamon can favour the production of chicory or varieties of Mediterranean 
origin) or of their inputs. Therefore, it is not possible to justify the exclusion of 
any group of products only due to fiscal reasons. In any case, this exclusion has 
to be individual and economically justified. As Serrano Sanz (1987: 115-16) 
explains, in the Spanish case not even the official literature gives a doctrinal 
explanation: 
Since there was no doctrinal definition of what was meant to be under-
stood by revenue-generating products, the outline of the group fades pro-
gressively and the number of products included in it keeps on 
augmenting. On the one hand, some goods of which there is no domestic 
production but an increasing trade are aggregated, for example petro-
leum or some chemical products. On the other, some domestically pro-
duced goods also provide increasing revenue, such as wheat. The truth is 
that, when the following tariff reform comes under discussion in 1906, 
seventy entries are identified as revenue-generating, whilst they were 22 in 
1869 (translated from Spanish). 
37 Very recently, Nye (1991) has argued that the so-called revenue-generating 
tariffs on wine and liquor need to be included to estimate British protection in 
the years 1800-75, in order to capture the protective effects of substitutes on 
the general consumption of beer (see also his recent controversy on this 
matter with Douglas Irving (March 1993». 
38 In the Spanish case, there are very clear examples of colonial foodstuffs that 
have direct substitutes, as is the case of beet and cane sugar. Where price 
increases due to revenue-generating tariffs on colonial foodstuffs such as cinna-
mon, pepper and clove may have had protective effects on nationally produced 
spices such as saffron, cumin, oregano or ground pepper. Something similar 
could be said of coffee, cocoa or tea, which, as with wine and beer in the 
English case, may have had substitutes for general consumption (chicory, for 
example). Any choice could seem arbitrary, and in this case we have intro-
duced many possible options including the more economically intuitive option 
of excluding a significant group of products without domestic production or 
close substitutes. See the text for details. 
39 Antonio Canovas del Castillo (1828-97) the principal architect of the restora-
tion of the Bourbon dynasty and author of the 1876 constitution, was several 
times prime minister between 1874 and his assassination in 1897. 
40 See Tena (2001). 
41 See Sabate (1996), Nadal-Sudria (1993), Comfn (1993), Pan Montojo (1994) 
and Tirado (1996a). 
42 Many other European tariff laws in this period were designed in the clamour of 
a commercial war with France and, in spite of starting from negotiating 
budgets similar to the Spanish one, it is possible to observe both a different 
nature and a different profile. A wide range of (international) literature on 
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this subject highlights that liberalisation and protectionist processes in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were accompanied by complex bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations. In every case, the objective of negotiations 
between governments is to reduce the damage caused by the increase of bar-
riers to the national products exported to foreign markets. 
43 Period in Spanish history running from 1868 to 1874. 
44 According to Vicens Vives, 1987: 
The 1886 crisis gave the opportunity to the Catalan protectionists to rally 
with the Basque metallurgic workers and the Castilian cereal-growers. That 
is how the battle for the tariffs in 1891 was won, and the bases for the pro-
tectionist articulation of the Spanish economy were established. The loss 
of the colonies in 1898 made matters worse and prepared for the adoption 
of the 1906 tariffs. 
Raymond Carr (1990) is even more explicit: 'Protectionists that had failed with 
the French treaty of 1882 succeeded in 1892 when the treaty with Germany was 
rejected by the Senate. With the National League of Producers, Catalonia had 
finally managed to create, after insisting for forty years, a "national" organisa-
tion in favour of protection that included the interests of the Basque steel and 
the Castilian wheat' (translated from the Spanish edition). The apparent 
contradiction of a mainly agricultural country where industry played the 
leading role in the demand for protection is resolved in 'olsonian' terms in 
Fraile (1991). 
